In case you doubt that the crisis is vast, the BBC (and many other news sources) have reported that the refugees from the latest fighting number as many as around 1.5 million.
Tuesday, May 19, 2009
US Pledges Emergency Aid to Pakistan
Good. Yes, that is my reaction. This aid is fortunately to help with the humanitarian crises in the northwest as opposed to military aid. That is what the US needs to be doing in order to gain the trust of Pakistanis and boost its reputation so as to gain more support for the fight against the Taliban.
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
BBC Releases Map Highlighting Strength of Taliban
I just thought it would be interesting to post this considering I've started out talking about Pakistan and the Taliban a fair amount. So here are two links to articles on the map and some BBC analysis. I'm not too surprised by their estimates.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8046577.stm
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8047504.stm
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8046577.stm
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8047504.stm
Tuesday, May 12, 2009
Pakistan Part 2
At this point I have a few more points to explain my the reasoning behind my conclusion that the Taliban doesn't pose an existential threat to Pakistan. But first, I think I should clarify exactly where I stand.
I don't doubt that the Taliban are dangerous. They have proven the capability to strike throughout much of Pakistan, using suicide bombs and even gunmen (as seen in the attack of the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore). But, they only are an important permanent force in the mountainous, Pashtun-dominated northwest. So I believe that the likely hood that the Taliban will actually be able to directly overthrow the Pakistani government is minimal at the most, and quite likely is effectively zero. However, the Taliban have succeeded in making large parts of the northwest areas not really under the control of the Pakistani government, and their control over these areas has helped destabilize Afghanistan. The Taliban's strength in the northwest cannot be tolerated, but their strength has been widely exaggerated. However, government policy regarding the Taliban could make or break the government (or any future administration), so in that sense, the Taliban can contribute to the fall of the government (or rather the transition to a new administration).
Here are my last points to support my reasoning. An important weakness for the Taliban is their idea of law. Contrary to popular belief, Taliban law is not derived entirely from Shariah (Islamic law, which in reality is no monolithic set of beliefs; there are many interpretations of Islamic law, and in this case Islamic doesn't necessarily mean fundamentalist), but also upon Pashtunwali (Pashtun tribal law/code). The Punjabis and Sindhis (who are a combined 58% of the country), don't follow Pashtunwali (a bit obvious, I know, but still worth pointing out). Therefore a law system which is partially derived from a tribal law not recognized by other groups such as Punjabis or Sindhis will therefore lack legitimacy among these groups.
My final reason, which is closely tied to the previous point, is that the Pashtun are still divided into tribes. They aren't unified. This was seen in the Soviet-Afghan war, when Pashtuns fore the most part failed to united with other ethnic groups (such as Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara, etc.) let alone other tribes of Pashtuns. The Taliban in Afghanistan were always dominated by one of the main tribes, the Durrani. In fact, their leadership (and even military force) was dominated by Durranis specifically from Kandahar. I have NEVER read any article which has indicated the Taliban and other related groups in Pakistan have allied across tribal lines. These tribal divisions do naturally make it extraordinarily difficult for the Pakistanis to achieve a convincing victory: they might manage to defeat one group, but many others would still remain. But, it also makes the idea of the militants succeeding in actually militarily defeating the Pakistani army, let alone completely toppling the government absurd.
But, just to make sure I have been clear. I am extremely worried by the resiliency of the militants, and the potential of Pakistan's northwest becoming a safe haven and training ground for global terrorism the way much of Afghanistan was in the 90's. But I am not worried about the actual safety of the Pakistani government, and the exaggerated fear of people as influential as Hillary Clinton seriously worries me. I hope that this administration will base its actions and policies based off of what is clearly real, as opposed to wild fears based off gut reaction.
I don't doubt that the Taliban are dangerous. They have proven the capability to strike throughout much of Pakistan, using suicide bombs and even gunmen (as seen in the attack of the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore). But, they only are an important permanent force in the mountainous, Pashtun-dominated northwest. So I believe that the likely hood that the Taliban will actually be able to directly overthrow the Pakistani government is minimal at the most, and quite likely is effectively zero. However, the Taliban have succeeded in making large parts of the northwest areas not really under the control of the Pakistani government, and their control over these areas has helped destabilize Afghanistan. The Taliban's strength in the northwest cannot be tolerated, but their strength has been widely exaggerated. However, government policy regarding the Taliban could make or break the government (or any future administration), so in that sense, the Taliban can contribute to the fall of the government (or rather the transition to a new administration).
Here are my last points to support my reasoning. An important weakness for the Taliban is their idea of law. Contrary to popular belief, Taliban law is not derived entirely from Shariah (Islamic law, which in reality is no monolithic set of beliefs; there are many interpretations of Islamic law, and in this case Islamic doesn't necessarily mean fundamentalist), but also upon Pashtunwali (Pashtun tribal law/code). The Punjabis and Sindhis (who are a combined 58% of the country), don't follow Pashtunwali (a bit obvious, I know, but still worth pointing out). Therefore a law system which is partially derived from a tribal law not recognized by other groups such as Punjabis or Sindhis will therefore lack legitimacy among these groups.
My final reason, which is closely tied to the previous point, is that the Pashtun are still divided into tribes. They aren't unified. This was seen in the Soviet-Afghan war, when Pashtuns fore the most part failed to united with other ethnic groups (such as Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara, etc.) let alone other tribes of Pashtuns. The Taliban in Afghanistan were always dominated by one of the main tribes, the Durrani. In fact, their leadership (and even military force) was dominated by Durranis specifically from Kandahar. I have NEVER read any article which has indicated the Taliban and other related groups in Pakistan have allied across tribal lines. These tribal divisions do naturally make it extraordinarily difficult for the Pakistanis to achieve a convincing victory: they might manage to defeat one group, but many others would still remain. But, it also makes the idea of the militants succeeding in actually militarily defeating the Pakistani army, let alone completely toppling the government absurd.
But, just to make sure I have been clear. I am extremely worried by the resiliency of the militants, and the potential of Pakistan's northwest becoming a safe haven and training ground for global terrorism the way much of Afghanistan was in the 90's. But I am not worried about the actual safety of the Pakistani government, and the exaggerated fear of people as influential as Hillary Clinton seriously worries me. I hope that this administration will base its actions and policies based off of what is clearly real, as opposed to wild fears based off gut reaction.
Monday, May 11, 2009
Failed Georgian Negotiations
After a month of protests, a number of opposition members met with PM Mikhail Saakashvili to try to ease tension. Today, BBC reported that the talks have stalled and no progress has been made.
Georgia seems to be facing a number of problems, a number of which aren't new. Saakashvili has been criticized for failing to seriously combat institutionalized corruption, despite his earlier promises. His predecessor, Eduard Shevardnadze was much the same. During the 70's and 80's he campaigned vigorously against corruption within the Communist Party. But during his presidency, he protected individuals involved in massive corruption, including members of his family.
Similarly, Saakashvili has been accused of being dictatorial. Both his predecessors (Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Shevardnadze) were frequently accused of dictatorial tactics. Gamsakhurdia was accused of violations of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of press among others. Shevardnadze rigged the 2003 elections, sparking the Rose Revolution.
The gist of what I am getting at is that one should not conclude that Saakashvili has been a major step backward for Georgia; at times members of the opposition have tried to make this fallacy appear true. It may not have improved dramatically, but corruption has been lessened in Georgia. Its rating on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index has improved from 1.8 when Saakashvili came to power in 2003, to to 3.9 as of 2008, with the scale running from 1 (worst) to 10 (best). Fairly small improvement, but progress nonetheless. As far as corruption goes, part of the problem seems to be that the opposition has unrealistic aspirations, and thinks corruption can be eliminated overnight, and Saakashvili's failure to do so proves he is a bad leader.
However, their allegations of bullying/unfair treatment of opposition members might well be valid. Certainly his provocation of Russia was stupid at best. Honestly, what was he thinking? In this matter, I have several hypotheses. The first is that he believed the US or NATO would intervene in Georgia's behalf. If this is the case, he is reckless and foolish. Taking such a high risk over two regions with a current (there has been ethnic cleansing resulting in hundreds of thousands of ethnic Georgians leaving Abkhazia and South Ossetia, most of it in the 90's) population of 500,000 (a high estimate). My other hypothesis is that he thought he would lose, but the Russians wouldn't devastate the country. He had been losing support domestically prior to the war, so perhaps he thought the war would appeal to the nationalistic fervor of the Georgians. If that is the case, then I'm not sure he can be described in words.
Back to the talks. They have failed, as have a month of protests and the demands of parts of the opposition that Saakashvili resign. What is going to happen? To be frank, I don't know. Saakashvili seems to be stubborn, as does the opposition. However, Georgian presidents are limited to 2 terms, and Saakashvili is current in his second term. Its possible that protests will continue (unsuccessfully), and by 2013, either Saakashvili will step down, or he will prove the opposition right and try to hold on to power. Of course, all sorts of things can happen in between now and then, so the future is very uncertain. However, I think we can safely guess the government and opposition won't agree on a deal any time soon.
Sunday, May 10, 2009
The End of Pakistan?
Hardly. For those who are confused, some have claimed that the fighting in the northwest of Pakistan, especially in the Swat Valley and nearby areas such as Buner indicate that the Taliban and other similar militant groups pose a serious existential threat to Pakistan.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8013677.stm
Sad to say, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is among these prophets of doom. Now, I'm not just refuting these claims because I don't want to sound pessimistic. In fact, I have often been criticized for being pessimistic. But I don't see these gloomy predictions as being based in fact.
The first reason that I doubt the Taliban's ability to pose an existential threat to Pakistan is the fact that there are massive ethnic differences between where the Taliban are popular and the rest of Pakistan. The Taliban are overwhelmingly Pashtun, an ethnic group which inhabits the northwest of Pakistan, and much of Afghanistan. Pashtuns compose around 12% of Pakistan. The only other ethnic group in Pakistan which shares relatively close ethno-linguistic ties is the Baluch, who are a mere 4% or so of Pakistan. The main ethnic group in Pakistan, the Punjabis (around 50%) don't share much in common culturally with the Pashtun. Their language is different, and many Punjabis have some affiliation with Sufi orders, which the Taliban reject.
Furthermore, politics in general in Pakistan tended to be divided (to a considerable extent, though not completely) along ethnic lines. For example, the PPP (led by the Bhutto family) is most dominant in Sindh amongst Sindhis, although it has strenght in parts of the Punjab. Its main rivals, the PLM-N and PML-Q are strong in the Punjab. Both however, have considerably less strength in the northwest, where much of the fighting is. For example, in the legislature of the NWFP, which includes Swat and Buner, the most powerful party (with 38 seats) is the Awami National Party, which is a Pashtun nationalist (secular) party. The PPP has 20 seats, and is followed by Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (a coalition of religious parties which wants Pakistan to be a theocracy opposes ties to the US) with 14 seats. The PML-N has 7 seats, PML-Q has 6, and a party which broke from the PPP has 6. The remaining 33 seats are unaffiliated with any party. By contrast, in the Punjabi legislatue, the PML-N is the leading party with 171 out of 370 seats. They are followed by the PPP (107), PML-Q (83), and the MMA has 2 seats. In Sindh, the leading party is the PPP (93 out of 166), followed by the MQM (which represents mostly the immigrants from India as a result of partition and their descendants) which has 51 seats, PML-Q (9), and the Awami National Party has 2 seats. The MMA has none, and the same goes for the PML-N.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/images/map-ethnic-1.gif
This map demonstrates to some extent where the various ethnic groups in Pakistan are distributed. It quickly becomes evident that politics are very closely tied to ethnic divisions. And the fact is that even in Afghanistan, the Taliban was overhwhelmingly Pashtun, even though Afghanistan is only 42% Pashtun.
Furthermore, there is the military infeasability of Pakistan takeover. The fact is that much of Pakistan's population is in the low-lying, flat provinces of Sindh and Punjab. If the Taliban were to venture into these areas, the Pakistanis could call in their air force. The Taliban have no reliable method of bringing down aircraft. The only reason the use of airstrikes has been unsuccessful is that they are fighting in their native terrain, which is mountainous. Out in a nice, flat plain, they would be sitting ducks, and would be pummeled in a matter of minutes if not seconds.
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5c/Pakistan_Topography.png
The link above is to a topo map of Pakistan. In case you aren't familiar with the term, it means that it physically demonstrates the variation in altitude (basically shows how mountainous or level parts of the country are).
I am tired right now, so this article will be continued at a later date. But, I will try to sort of give you a sense for my opinions. Basically, I've shown that the Taliban and other groups don't really pose a existential threat to Pakistan. But, there is no doubt that they can continue to dominate the country's northwest and basically set up an effectively independent nation (or nations, as I will show in part 2), which is undoubtedly a problem, and cannot be allowed to happen (though arguably it has already happened to some extent).
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8013677.stm
Sad to say, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is among these prophets of doom. Now, I'm not just refuting these claims because I don't want to sound pessimistic. In fact, I have often been criticized for being pessimistic. But I don't see these gloomy predictions as being based in fact.
The first reason that I doubt the Taliban's ability to pose an existential threat to Pakistan is the fact that there are massive ethnic differences between where the Taliban are popular and the rest of Pakistan. The Taliban are overwhelmingly Pashtun, an ethnic group which inhabits the northwest of Pakistan, and much of Afghanistan. Pashtuns compose around 12% of Pakistan. The only other ethnic group in Pakistan which shares relatively close ethno-linguistic ties is the Baluch, who are a mere 4% or so of Pakistan. The main ethnic group in Pakistan, the Punjabis (around 50%) don't share much in common culturally with the Pashtun. Their language is different, and many Punjabis have some affiliation with Sufi orders, which the Taliban reject.
Furthermore, politics in general in Pakistan tended to be divided (to a considerable extent, though not completely) along ethnic lines. For example, the PPP (led by the Bhutto family) is most dominant in Sindh amongst Sindhis, although it has strenght in parts of the Punjab. Its main rivals, the PLM-N and PML-Q are strong in the Punjab. Both however, have considerably less strength in the northwest, where much of the fighting is. For example, in the legislature of the NWFP, which includes Swat and Buner, the most powerful party (with 38 seats) is the Awami National Party, which is a Pashtun nationalist (secular) party. The PPP has 20 seats, and is followed by Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (a coalition of religious parties which wants Pakistan to be a theocracy opposes ties to the US) with 14 seats. The PML-N has 7 seats, PML-Q has 6, and a party which broke from the PPP has 6. The remaining 33 seats are unaffiliated with any party. By contrast, in the Punjabi legislatue, the PML-N is the leading party with 171 out of 370 seats. They are followed by the PPP (107), PML-Q (83), and the MMA has 2 seats. In Sindh, the leading party is the PPP (93 out of 166), followed by the MQM (which represents mostly the immigrants from India as a result of partition and their descendants) which has 51 seats, PML-Q (9), and the Awami National Party has 2 seats. The MMA has none, and the same goes for the PML-N.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/images/map-ethnic-1.gif
This map demonstrates to some extent where the various ethnic groups in Pakistan are distributed. It quickly becomes evident that politics are very closely tied to ethnic divisions. And the fact is that even in Afghanistan, the Taliban was overhwhelmingly Pashtun, even though Afghanistan is only 42% Pashtun.
Furthermore, there is the military infeasability of Pakistan takeover. The fact is that much of Pakistan's population is in the low-lying, flat provinces of Sindh and Punjab. If the Taliban were to venture into these areas, the Pakistanis could call in their air force. The Taliban have no reliable method of bringing down aircraft. The only reason the use of airstrikes has been unsuccessful is that they are fighting in their native terrain, which is mountainous. Out in a nice, flat plain, they would be sitting ducks, and would be pummeled in a matter of minutes if not seconds.
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5c/Pakistan_Topography.png
The link above is to a topo map of Pakistan. In case you aren't familiar with the term, it means that it physically demonstrates the variation in altitude (basically shows how mountainous or level parts of the country are).
I am tired right now, so this article will be continued at a later date. But, I will try to sort of give you a sense for my opinions. Basically, I've shown that the Taliban and other groups don't really pose a existential threat to Pakistan. But, there is no doubt that they can continue to dominate the country's northwest and basically set up an effectively independent nation (or nations, as I will show in part 2), which is undoubtedly a problem, and cannot be allowed to happen (though arguably it has already happened to some extent).
Why I Am Blogging
So I'm guessing you might be wondering, what is the purpose of this blog? Why am I going to be writing? What am I going to be writing. The answer is not simple, but I will do the best I can.
First, the what. I plan to focus mainly on politics and current events, especially relating to the Middle East, Eastern Europe (mainly Balkans), and Central Asia. Other areas will be covered if and when I feel like it, often if something momentous occurs. I will occasionally discus other issues such as reactions to history books I have read, literature reviews, and football (or soccer, though I prefer the term football).
Why? To be blunt, because I love to rant. There are things I feel very strongly about and I think having a blog will enable me to express myself in a way that I can't necessarily otherwise. If people don't read my blog, well at least I'll feel like I have my opinions written down. Not that I mind having an audience, or rather people to discuss with. I don't want this to feel just like a lecture. I want to feel like if people read this, they feel like they can freely respond. So please, if what I say makes you think, feel free to comment. But please, keep comments civil. I retain the right to moderate comments, so anything which is unnecessarily rude or derogatory will not be allowed. Otherwise, please respond to what I say. I hope you enjoy!
First, the what. I plan to focus mainly on politics and current events, especially relating to the Middle East, Eastern Europe (mainly Balkans), and Central Asia. Other areas will be covered if and when I feel like it, often if something momentous occurs. I will occasionally discus other issues such as reactions to history books I have read, literature reviews, and football (or soccer, though I prefer the term football).
Why? To be blunt, because I love to rant. There are things I feel very strongly about and I think having a blog will enable me to express myself in a way that I can't necessarily otherwise. If people don't read my blog, well at least I'll feel like I have my opinions written down. Not that I mind having an audience, or rather people to discuss with. I don't want this to feel just like a lecture. I want to feel like if people read this, they feel like they can freely respond. So please, if what I say makes you think, feel free to comment. But please, keep comments civil. I retain the right to moderate comments, so anything which is unnecessarily rude or derogatory will not be allowed. Otherwise, please respond to what I say. I hope you enjoy!
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)